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1 
MARYLAND’S CONTRACTUAL CONCEPTION OF INSURANCE: 
THE IMPROVIDENT GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN  
PICD v. STATE FARM 
STEVEN M. KLEPPER∗ 
On January 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certi-
orari in People’s Insurance Counsel Division v. State Farm Fire & Casual-
ty Co. (“PICD v. State Farm”).1  Question one of the petition was whether 
the Court of Appeals should “reexamine Maryland common law on constru-
ing insurance contracts and, recognizing that such contracts are not the 
product of equal bargaining, hold that terms contained in an insurance poli-
cy must be strictly construed against the insurer?”2  This question is pro-
vocative but misguided.  First, the appeal is from an administrative proceed-
ing where the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”) lacked 
jurisdiction to apply such principles of contract construction.  Second, the 
record indicates that the petitioner failed to press more apt remedies for the 
facts of the case.  On the substance, the petitioner advocates a rule that at 
best adds nothing to the analysis and at worst destabilizes Maryland insur-
ance law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
PICD v. State Farm turns on bad facts with the potential to make even 
worse law.  Moira and Gregory Taylor filed an administrative complaint 
with the MIA when State Farm denied coverage for the collapse of their 
carport during a February 2010 blizzard.3  The Taylors alleged, and the 
commissioner found, that, when they “decided to erect a detached carport” 
in 2007, “Ms. Taylor called Angela Yancey, her State Farm insurance 
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 1.  214 Md. App. 438, 76 A.3d 517 (2013), cert. granted, 436 Md. 501, 83 A.3d 779 (2014). 
 2.  Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 4, PICD v. State Farm, 436 Md. 501, 83 A.3d 779 (2014) (No. 
21, Sept. Term 2014) [hereinafter Pet. Writ Cert.]. 
 3.  PICD v. State Farm, 214 Md. App. at 440–41, 76 A.3d at 519. 
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agent, to ask whether a carport would be ‘covered’ under the Policy.  Ms. 
Yancey replied that it would be ‘covered.’”4 
When the Taylors reported the claim in February 2010, Ms. Yancey 
cut the Taylors a $1,250 check from her discretionary funds to remove the 
carport.5  But when State Farm dispatched a catastrophe team from Ala-
bama to adjust the losses, the field representatives “were verbally instructed 
by their on-site team managers that under the standard policy language 
losses due to collapse only were covered for buildings and that a building is 
a structure with a roof and at least three walls.”6  Upon seeing a picture of 
the Taylors’ unwalled carport, Jeanie Havens, a State Farm catastrophe 
team representative, informed the Taylors that the loss was not covered.7 
The MIA, following a seven-month investigation into the Taylors’ 
complaint, “determined that State Farm’s action in denying the claim ‘ha[d] 
not been shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in good faith.’”8  
Thereafter, at the Taylors’ request, the MIA held a hearing.  Over State 
Farm’s objection, the Administration permitted the People’s Insurance 
Counsel Division (“PICD”) to intervene.  A unit of the Office of the Attor-
ney General, PICD “evaluates each complaint filed with the MIA by a con-
sumer arising under a homeowners insurance policy,” and, “[i]f it deter-
mines that ‘the interests of insurance consumers [may be] affected’ by the 
resolution of the complaint, it may intervene and appear on behalf of insur-
ance consumers before the MIA and the courts.”9  PICD introduced expert 
testimony from a public adjuster that the carport was a “building” within 
the policy’s collapse coverage.10 
The MIA found that State Farm had not engaged in an unfair claim 
settlement practice “because ‘the only reasonable interpretation of [the poli-
cy] is that [the Taylors’] permanent carport is a building,’” and “‘Maryland 
appellate cases make plain that the language of an insurance policy is de-
terminative of coverage and contrary representations by insurance agents 
have no impact on whether a loss is covered.’”11  The Circuit Court af-
firmed the MIA’s decision.12 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals found that, under the narrow 
scope of judicial review of administrative orders, there was “substantial ev-
idence to support [the MIA’s] ultimate determination that State Farm de-
                                                          
 4.  Id. at 443, 76 A.3d at 520. 
 5.  Id. at 443–44, 76 A.3d at 520. 
 6.  Id. at 444, 76 A.3d at 521 (emphasis omitted). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 445, 76 A.3d at 521 (alteration in original). 
 9.  Id. at 441 n.1, 76 A.3d at 519 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV’T § 6-306(a) (LexisNexis 2009)). 
 10.  Id. at 445, 76 A.3d at 521. 
 11.  Id. at 448–49, 76 A.3d at 523 (alterations in original). 
 12.  Id. at 449, 76 A.3d at 523. 
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nied the Taylors’ claim based upon a ‘lawful principle or standard’ that the 
insurer applied consistently to all claims” and that “[o]n this basis alone, we 
would affirm the decision of the MIA.”13 
If only the Court of Special Appeals had stopped there.  Instead, it 
proceeded to hold that “we agree with State Farm’s interpretation of its Pol-
icy language, as did the MIA, and also would affirm on that basis.”14  That 
unnecessary holding paved the way for the grant of certiorari by the Court 
of Appeals. 
II.  MISAPPREHENSION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE 
MIA 
The MIA, PICD, and State Farm were laboring under a shared mis-
conception of the MIA’s scope of review of the Taylors’ complaint under 
Section 27-303 of the Insurance Article.  Under that statute, “[i]t is an un-
fair claim settlement practice . . . for an insurer” to “refuse to pay a claim 
for an arbitrary or capricious reason based on all available information” or 
to “fail to act in good faith . . . in settling a first-party claim under a policy 
of property and casualty insurance.”15  “Good faith” is defined as “an in-
formed judgment based on honesty and diligence supported by evidence the 
insurer knew or should have known at the time the insurer made a decision 
on a claim.”16 
Under that standard, the MIA’s Section 27-303 analysis could have 
and should have stopped once it determined that State Farm’s coverage de-
termination was reasonable.  It was completely unnecessary for the MIA to 
proceed to find that State Farm’s interpretation of “building” was the only 
reasonable interpretation.  Under Maryland law, agency determinations that 
are “not essential to [a] decision to deny [a] claim . . . can have no preclu-
sive effect” between the parties.17  “Such determinations have the character-
istics of dicta, and may not ordinarily be the subject of an appeal by the par-
ty against whom they were made.”18 
A traditional administrative complaint under Section 27-303 stands in 
stark contrast with a civil complaint under Section 27-1001 of the Insurance 
Article.  The latter statute, enacted in 2007, authorizes the MIA to deter-
mine “whether the insurer is obligated under the applicable policy to cover 
the underlying first-party claim” and, if the insurer breached such an obliga-
                                                          
 13.  Id. at 452, 76 A.3d at 525–26. 
 14.  Id. at 453, 76 A.3d at 526. 
 15.  MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-303(2), (9) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 16.  Id. § 27-1001(a). 
 17.  Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 552, 555 A.2d 502, 506 (1989). 
 18.  Id. at 551, 555 A.2d at 505–06 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 
cmt. h (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tion, whether the insurer “failed to act in good faith.”19  The MIA decision 
against the Taylors expressly noted that their complaint was not under Sec-
tion 27-1001.20  Because the cost of rebuilding the carport was approxi-
mately $1,706.00,21 the proper forum for the Taylors to initiate such a civil 
action under the “good faith” statute would have been small claims court.22 
Nothing in the MIA’s Section 27-303 decision against the Taylors 
would have prevented them from going to court and filing a claim for 
breach of contract or a claim in equity.23  Because it was not necessary for 
the MIA to find that only State Farm’s interpretation was reasonable, the 
Taylors would have been entitled to advocate that their interpretation was 
also reasonable and, if so, to introduce their 2007 conversations with their 
agent as extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.24 
The limited nature of the Taylors’ Section 27-303 complaint compels 
three conclusions.  First, the MIA should not have opined that State Farm’s 
interpretation was the only reasonable reading of “building.”  Second, the 
Court of Special Appeals should not have affirmed the MIA’s ruling on that 
alternative ground, which was not properly a subject of the Taylors’ ap-
peal.25  Third, the Court of Appeals improvidently granted certiorari on the 
questions that PICD’s petition presented. 
Question 1 of the petition improperly asks the Court of Appeals to 
“reexamine Maryland common law on construing insurance contracts” in an 
appeal from a proceeding that asks only whether the insurer’s coverage de-
termination is “arbitrary or capricious” or lacking in good faith—not 
whether the insurer’s determination is actually correct.  PICD’s second 
Question Presented is equally misguided: 
 Did the Commissioner err in allowing State Farm to deny cov-
erage for damage to a collapsed carport under a policy that in-
sured against “the sudden, entire collapse of a building” based on 
a restrictive definition of the term “building” that does not appear 
in the insurance policy or any other written document, and is 
based only on oral instructions given to a catastrophe claims ad-
                                                          
 19.  MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-1001(e)(1)(i)(1), (4). 
 20.  Md. Ins. Admin. ex rel G.T. & M.T. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Case No. MIA-2011-
01-007 at 14 n.15 (Md. Ins. Admin. Mar. 23, 2012). 
 21.  Id. at 6 n.8. 
 22.  MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-1001(c)(1), (2) (stating that the requirement of first filing 
“good faith” civil action with MIA “does not apply to an action . . . within the small claim juris-
diction of the District Court under § 4-405 of the Courts Article”). 
 23.  Id. § 27-301(b)(3) (“This subtitle does not impair the right of a person to seek redress in 
law or equity for conduct that otherwise is actionable.”). 
 24.  See Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508–09, 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995) (ex-
plaining analysis for adjudicating claims of ambiguity); Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 
315 Md. 543, 550–51, 555 A.2d 502, 506 (1989) (describing non-binding nature of unnecessary 
administrative rulings). 
 25.  Murray, 315 Md. at 550–51, 555 A.2d at 505–06. 
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juster when she was dispatched to handle claims following a se-
vere snowstorm?26 
As the Court of Special Appeals opinion establishes in detail, State 
Farm’s reading of the policy is clearly at least reasonable.27  And it is simp-
ly inaccurate for PICD to assert that the interpretation of the policy was ad 
hoc.  Just as the MIA credited the Taylors’ testimony regarding their con-
versations with their agent, the MIA also found that State Farm’s instruc-
tions to its adjuster “were consistent with instructions she had received in 
the past concerning the meaning of the term ‘building.’”28  The adjuster’s 
“testimony on this point was clear.  She stated that she had been ‘advised 
before [i.e., prior to the 2010 blizzard] that a building for policy purposes 
would constitute a roofing structure with at least three walls.’”29  PICD dis-
putes the inferences to be drawn from the adjuster’s testimony that she used 
a similar definition of “building” in adjusting flood losses,30 but the Court 
of Appeals will need to “review the record in the light most favorable to the 
agency and ‘defer to [its] fact-finding and drawing of inferences’ if sup-
ported by any evidence in the record.”31  Even if PICD clears this hurdle, it 
remains unclear how State Farm could be held to have acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously, or without good faith, if the controversy turned on a pure 
question of policy interpretation that the MIA and three Court of Special 
Appeals judges found to be reasonable. Given the limitations of administra-
tive proceeding below, PICD’s petition raises no questions appropriate for 
review by the Court of Appeals. 
III.  THE LIMITED THEORY THAT PICD CHOSE TO PRESS 
If the Court of Appeals does proceed to the merits of PICD v. State 
Farm, I fear that the facts of the case will make bad law.  The record, as es-
tablished by the MIA’s findings, is that the Taylors, in building their car-
port, relied on their State Farm agent’s representation that the carport would 
be covered.  That fact-pattern is highly unusual, and I have never seen it in 
twelve years of litigating homeowners insurance claims.  I can envision a 
majority of the Court of Appeals concluding that the situation is so unjust 
that it cries out for relief.  Here again, it is important to remember the nature 
of the administrative proceeding below and how the parties framed the is-
sues below. 
                                                          
 26.  Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at 4. 
 27.  PICD v. State Farm, 214 Md. App. 438, 454–56 & nn.8–9, 76 A.3d 517, 526–28 & nn.8–
9 (2013), cert. granted, 436 Md. 501, 83 A.3d 779 (2014). 
 28.  Id. at 447–48, 76 A.3d at 523. 
 29.  Id. at 451 n.6, 76 A.3d at 525 n.6.  
 30.  Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at 14-16. 
 31.  PICD, 214 Md. App. at 449, 76 A.3d at 524 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Phy-
sician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 380–81 (1999)). 
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When the PICD intervened in the Taylors’ MIA hearing, it pursued a 
very specific theory—that “building” was synonymous with “structure” and 
therefore included carports with fewer than three walls.32  This strategy fits 
with PICD’s statutory authorization to evaluate individual complaints to de-
termine “whether the interests of insurance consumers are affected” and to 
intervene only in such proceedings of general interest.33  PICD did not pre-
sent an alternative claim that State Farm’s interpretation of “building” was 
correct and therefore that State Farm had violated Section 27-303’s separate 
prohibition on insurers “misrepresent[ing] pertinent . . . policy provisions 
that relate to the . . . coverage at issue.”34  State Farm, which employs a 
network of “captive agents,” is responsible for any actionable misrepresen-
tations by its agents, like Ms. Yancey.35  Or, indeed, the Taylors simply 
could have filed an MIA complaint directly against their agent.36  I do not 
know whether such alternative claims would have been viable, but the fail-
ure even to allege such a violation is conspicuous, given the degree to 
which the Taylors’ contentions turned on the agent’s representations. 
Such alternative claims would have turned on the Taylors’ idiosyncrat-
ic circumstances, and therefore would not affect insurance consumers gen-
erally.  PICD’s petition for certiorari makes its mission clear: 
 Tens of thousands of Marylanders own carports or other “build-
ings” on their property with fewer than “three enclosed walls,” 
such as gazebos and pavilions.  The intermediate appellate court’s 
reported opinion, if left standing, will prove devastating to those 
consumers who have homeowner’s insurance and suddenly find 
that they are not eligible for collapse coverage under their policies 
for those buildings.37 
This passage illustrates not only that PICD had no interest in pursuing 
a claim that State Farm misrepresented its coverage, but also that PICD 
misunderstands the likely consequences of any potential reversal by the 
Court of Appeals.  As the Court of Special Appeals noted, “It is logical that 
collapse coverage would exclude un-walled (or partially walled) structures 
because such structures likely would be less sturdy and more susceptible to 
collapse.”38  PICD’s expert, reviewing Maryland homeowners policies is-
                                                          
 32.  Id. at 445–46, 76 A.3d at 521–22. 
 33.  MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 6-306(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 34.  MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-303(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 35.  See Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 156–57, 634 A.2d 28, 38 (1993). 
 36.  See MARYLAND INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION COMPLAINT FORM: COMPLAINT 
AGAINST INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS OR AUTHORIZED INSURANCE ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL, 
available at 
http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa/docs/documents/consumer/publicnew/insurance-
professionals-complaint-form-final.pdf.  
 37.  Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at 2. 
 38.  PICD v. State Farm, 214 Md. App. 438, 455 n.8, 76 A.3d 517, 527 n.8 (2014). 
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sued by ten different insurers, found that “[o]ne of those policies, issued by 
Allstate, defined the term ‘building structure’ to mean a ‘building with a 
roof and four walls’” but that the “other nine policies,” like State Farm’s 
policy, “did not define the term ‘building.’”39 
PICD essentially seeks to penalize State Farm for failing to employ 
Allstate’s definition, which the Court of Special Appeals found unnecessary 
in this case.  Given the increased risk of susceptibility of collapse for struc-
tures with fewer than three walls, the most likely result would be that insur-
ers would include, in their Maryland homeowners endorsements, a provi-
sion specifically defining “building” to require at least three walls.40  Going 
forward, only the General Assembly could impose the coverage require-
ment that PICD seeks.41  PICD pursued a limited, flawed theory that it 
found to be of general interest, not a strategy calculated to benefit the Tay-
lors on the specific facts of their case. 
IV.  FLAWS IN PICD’S PROPOSED RULE 
I have written previously to challenge arguments that insurance con-
tracts are categorically the product of unequal bargaining power and should 
be subject to different rules of construction.42  Two powerful market forces 
aid policyholders in expanding the scope of homeowners policies: (1) the 
ability of independent insurance brokers, by advising homeowners of the 
range of coverage available on the insurance market, to collectively broaden 
coverage, or at least to resist narrowing of coverage;43 and (2) the influence 
of mortgage companies, who own the majority of equity in homes nation-
wide, in shaping the scope of coverage under a standard “all-risk” home-
owners policy special form 3 (“HO3”).44 
At first blush, PICD v. State Farm appears a poor test-case for this hy-
pothesis.  As noted previously, State Farm sells its homeowners policies 
through a network of captive agents.  One study of variations among home-
owners policy forms suggests that “the carriers who employ the least gener-
ous policy forms disproportionately use captive agents to distribute their 
policies, whereas the companies with unusually generous policies tend to 
                                                          
 39.  Id. at 445–46, 76 A.3d at 521–22. 
 40.  In my experience, Maryland homeowners policies typically contain endorsements con-
tracting around the broad interpretation of “collapse” in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. 
DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 725, 261 A.2d 747, 752 (1970). 
 41.  See MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 19-201 to 19-215 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2013) (setting 
requirements for homeowners policies). 
 42.  Steven M. Klepper, Response, Whose Conception of Insurance?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 83 (2013). 
 43.  Id. at 85. 
 44.  Id. at 87–89. 
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rely on independent agents.”45  But the policy language at issue in PICD v. 
State Farm is in fact standard HO3 language.46  As the Court of Special 
Appeals noted, a review of the policy as a whole showed that it unmistaka-
bly—and with good reason—used the terms “building” and “structure” to 
mean different things.47 
Further, reviewing the state of Maryland law, I do not see anything 
constructive to be achieved by the PICD’s proposed rule “that terms con-
tained in an insurance policy must be strictly construed against the insurer.”  
Maryland courts currently engage in a three-stage analysis of policy lan-
guage.  First, if a reasonably prudent layperson would understand the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the insurance policy language as susceptible to on-
ly one meaning, then the language is unambiguous, and the court applies 
the policy language as written.48  Second, if a reasonably prudent person 
would understand the language as susceptible to two or more meanings, 
then the language is ambiguous, and the court will consider extrinsic and 
parol evidence in an attempt to resolve that ambiguity.49  Third, if, after 
considering extrinsic evidence, an ambiguity still exists, the court construes 
the ambiguous language against the drafter of the policy.50 
There are only two points in the analysis where PICD’s proposed rule 
could change the result.  Perhaps PICD would propose that, at the first 
stage, the policyholder could create an ambiguity by presenting an unrea-
sonable reading of the policy.  But why would a court want to apply an in-
terpretation that a reasonably prudent layperson would reject?  Or perhaps 
PICD would propose to eliminate the second step, such that ambiguous pol-
icy language would be construed against the insurer, even if extrinsic and 
parol evidence showed that both parties intended the insurer’s interpreta-
tion.  But such a ruling would give a windfall to the policyholders, who 
would receive coverage where the facts establish that they knew they did 
not purchase such coverage. 
                                                          
 45.  Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1263, 1277 (2011). 
 46.  See Homeowners Composite Form: Section I—Perils Insured Against, in SUSAN J. 
MILLER, MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED (6th ed. 2011) (presenting a 
modern composite HO3 form and stating collapse coverage applies only to “building,” which is 
not a defined term). 
 47.  PICD v. State Farm, 214 Md. App. 438, 454–55 & nn.8–9, 76 A.3d 517, 526–27 & nn.8–
9 (2014).  “It is logical that collapse coverage would exclude un-walled (or partially walled) struc-
tures because such structures likely would be less sturdy and more susceptible to collapse.”  Id. at 
455 n.8, 76 A.3d at 527 n.8. 
 48.  Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508, 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995).  The Maryland 
cases do not phrase the analysis as involving three stages.  But I find these three stages to be the 
best way to describe the application of cases like Sullins. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 508–09, 667 A.2d at 619. 
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Whatever effect PICD’s proposed rule would have on Maryland law 
generally, there is no reason to believe that PICD’s proposed rule would ac-
tually help the Taylors in this case.  PICD asserts that forty-four jurisdic-
tions follow its proposed rule.51  That assertion is overbroad and inaccu-
rate.52  PICD relies almost exclusively on authorities holding that exclusions 
are construed strictly against insurers.53  The Taylors’ claim, however, turns 
on the collapse coverage’s insuring agreement, not any exclusion to that 
coverage.54  In any event, PICD identifies Georgia and New Hampshire as 
two states allegedly following its proposed rule.55  Both those jurisdictions 
have rejected PICD’s interpretation of the word “building.”56 
PICD’s proposed rule depends on flawed premises and offers no 
meaningful aid to the Taylors or similarly situated homeowners.  With sur-
prising frequency, the Court of Appeals, following oral argument, dismisses 
certiorari as improvidently granted.57  There is ample reason to believe that 
it will realize the improvidence of granting certiorari in PICD v. State 
Farm. 
 
                                                          
 51.  Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at 8 & n.4. 
 52.  Compare, e.g., Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at App’x A (citing Leski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 116 N.W.2d 718, 721 (Mich. 1962) (“[I]n case of reasonable uncertainty, doubt, or 
ambiguity, courts should construe policies of insurance which are not standard policies strictly or 
most strongly against the insurer.”)), with Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 788 
(Mich. 2003) (“[T]he rule of reasonable expectations has no application in Michigan, and those 
cases that recognized this doctrine are to that extent overruled.”).  For a more illuminating over-
view, see RANDY J. MANILOFF & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 577–601 (2d ed. 2012). 
 53.  See Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at 8–9, 13; see also ALLAN D. WINDT, 2 INSURANCE 
CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES & INSUREDS § 9:1 (6th ed. 
2013) (discussing differing burdens as to insuring agreement and exclusions). 
 54.  PICD v. State Farm, 214 Md. App. 438, 442, 76 A.3d 517, 520 (2014). 
 55.  Pet. Writ Cert., supra note 2, at App’x A (citing Clark v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 404 
S.E.2d 149, 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Kelly v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 796 A.2d 156, 
157 (N.H. 2002)). 
 56.  PICD, 214 Md. App. at 456, 76 A.3d at 528 (citing Bergeron v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 766 A.2d 256, 259 (N.H. 2000); Arkin v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1997)). 
 57.  See Dodge v. State, 436 Md. 200, 80 A.3d 1118 (2013); Karanikas v. Cartwright, 436 
Md. 73, 80 A.3d 1045 (2013); Price v. State, 435 Md. 321, 77 A.3d 1115 (2013); Aleman v. State, 
435 Md. 145, 77 A.3d 486 (2013); Anthony v. Garrity, 431 Md. 389, 65 A.3d 690 (2013); Hunt v. 
Aberdeen Proving Ground Fed. Credit Union, 430 Md. 641, 62 A.3d 728 (2013).  Alternatively, 
the Court of Appeals could, as it did in a recent insurance decision, affirm the decision of the 
Court of Special Appeals, with the exception of the holding that State Farm’s coverage determina-
tion was actually correct.  See TIG Ins. Co. v. Monongahela Power Co., 437 Md. 372, 373–74, 86 
A.3d 1245, 1245–46 (2014). 
